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## **POLICING THE NEW WORLD ORDER: AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY**

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**ABSTRACT.** The United States responded decisively in the recent Persian Gulf crisis. The Bush Administration considered successful resolution of this crisis a precursor to the "new world order". Many questions now confront policymakers as America approaches the 21st Century. A pressing question is: Can America continue to serve as the world's policeman? America's challenge for the 1990s is to avoid the trappings of world policing that past superpowers have experienced throughout history, *a la Pax Britannica*. The United States can achieve this by first, formulating its national security strategy to elevate the role of the United Nations as the world's policeman. Second, the United States' national security strategy should support establishment of a United Nations standing peacemaking force. This force would provide the United Nations and international community a short notice military employment capability during the early "warning period" of an impending crisis. Such a force would ultimately lower the United States' profile as the world policeman in the emerging new world order.

## **POLICING THE NEW WORLD ORDER: AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY**

Once again the United States has responded to a world crisis; this time to turn back Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. The United States responded to this crisis because no other nation or international body was willing, or capable, of decisive intervention. Throughout the crisis, the United States acted in the name of the United Nations and President Bush's vision of a post-Cold War new world order.

So, where does resolution of this crisis leave America as the pre-eminent superpower in the new world order paradigm? By whom and how will the next world crisis be policed? Implicit in these questions is an assumption that the trend in the United States to lower its profile in policing the new world order will continue.

One response to these questions is the establishment of a standing United Nations *peacemaking* force to assist in maintaining the new world order and enforcing U.N. resolutions, as required.

This essay addresses in five parts the establishment of a standing U.N. *peacemaking* force. First, it analyzes the circumstances and the international implications of America's involvement in the Persian Gulf War; second, it discusses the resultant new world order and the U.N.'s inability to enforce world order; third, it highlights a deficiency in America's emerging defense strategy for the

new world order. The fourth part is a proposal for a standing U.N. peacemaking force which the United States would support in the 1990s. And finally, I will conclude with a view of America's future in policing the new world order.

## I

### VICTORY IN THE PERSIAN GULF: A DEFINING MOMENT FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER

#### *IRAQ'S ACT OF AGGRESSION*

The international community entered the 1990s with world events headed on unexpected, but promising vectors. Then on August 2 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. This date represents a point in modern time when the international community struggled with what to do. Who would respond, and how was Iraq's aggression to be dealt with considering its implications for regional and world economic instability?

Iraq's aggression created a challenge for modern nation-states to circumscribe the boundaries of acceptable international behavior. In response to the challenge, President Bush geared up the U.S. national security apparatus to confront this international menace. As the world's pre-eminent superpower, the U.S. acted decisively to force Saddam Hussein to comply with acceptable international behavior.

#### *AMERICA'S RESPONSE: A TWO-PRONGED STRATEGY*

From the beginning of the Persian Gulf crisis, it was apparent to the Bush administration that a counter to Iraq's aggression required a swift two-pronged strategy. First, the U.S. responded unilaterally by communicating a series of demarches to the Iraqi government stating the U.S. would protect its national interests in the region. Further, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the U.S. would assist its friends to halt aggression and protect their territorial sovereignty. Second, the Bush administration recognized early on that the international magnitude of the crisis denied any possibility for America's response to remain strictly unilateral--there were simply too many variables which dictated a coalition response.

The Bush administration also deduced that its crisis response could not rely solely upon the unresponsive devices of the United Nations. Therefore, a perceptive President Bush sought the underpinning for action by co-opting the United Nations. Through subsequent U.N. resolutions--interpreted as an international mandate for action--the American President formulated his strategy, formed a coalition, then acted to protect United States' and world interests.

America's strategy in response the Persian Gulf crisis is a critical benchmark as we approach the 21st century and a new world order. For it is America's crisis response which enables us to identify a serious problem confronting

the new world order; the United Nations' inability to fulfill its charter responsibility for enforcing world order. This shortcoming compels stronger nations, and not the U.N., to respond to crises similar to those presented by Iraq. This shortcoming and its implications will be addressed later.

But for now, it's instructive at this point to consider why President Bush focused so much attention on linking resolution of the Persian Gulf crisis to the new world order. The following discussion will examine this point.

## II

### A NEW WORLD ORDER

#### *PRESIDENTIAL VISION AND DEFENSE GUIDANCE*

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait generated countless debates on the prospects of a new world order. Accordingly, early on in the crisis, President Bush proclaimed Iraq's act of aggression as one which necessitated total international condemnation. The President considered decisive resolution of this crisis essential to establishment of a new world order. Further, he considered this crisis a crucial test of international resolve, and without it, the new world order stood to be vitiated by future despots and tyrants.

In light of the Bush administration's pre-Persian Gulf War resolve and its linkage to the new world order, it is now somewhat confounding to observe the emergence of United States' defense strategy. As you will see, the two are

somewhat incongruent given U.S. rationale for taking the lead in responding to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Let's consider this incongruency first by assessing the President's new world order vision, then a brief analysis of the emerging U.S. defense strategy.

The President provided the essential elements of his new world order vision in a speech on August 2, 1990--the same day Iraq invaded Kuwait. He spoke of a changed world, no longer divided by the East-West struggle:

The decades-old division of Europe is ending--and the era of democracy--democracy building--has begun..... We've entered a remarkable stage in our relationship with the Soviet Union. The changes that I'm talking about have transformed our security environment. We're entering a new era: the defense strategy and military structure needed to ensure peace can--and must--be different. Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to these changing strategic circumstances. In a world less driven by an immediate threat to Europe and the danger of global war--in a world where the size of our forces will increasingly be shaped by the needs of regional contingencies and peacetime presence--we know that our forces can be smaller.<sup>1</sup>

Further scrutiny of the speech reveals several key elements to his vision of a new world order. First and most important is that our security environment has been transformed primarily by a diminished Soviet threat. Second, with a change in the threat, we witness a new era accompanied by the emergence of democracies. Finally, changing strategic circumstances dictate a need for reshaping America's forces for regional contingencies and peacetime presence. As the President's new world order description suggests, the aggregate impact of these key



elements, perforce drive the United States to evaluate its defense strategy and concomitant force structure in a different light. His new world order vision sets the stage for defense strategy changes.

### III

#### RESHAPING THE FORCE FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER

##### CONVERTING POLICY GUIDANCE TO A DEFENSE STRATEGY

Based on the President's guidance and vision of the new world order, Secretary of Defense Cheney enunciated the new defense strategy in testimony before both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on February 7 and 21, 1991, respectively. He was accompanied by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, who articulated the nation's armed forces restructuring plan to support the president's defense policy and budget guidance.

As testified to, the new defense strategy secures national interests and focuses on national security objectives which include: 1) survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation; 2) a healthy and growing U.S. economy; 3) a stable and secure world, and 4) healthy relations with allies.

The Chairman expounded upon the global interests and responsibilities which require military forces to be able to provide a wide-range of capabilities. As planned, all military services experience force decrements over a five year period. The force decrements create a smaller force,

but one expected to perform the same missions--less a global conventional war--but under a new and different command structure.

The substance of the new defense strategy entails reconfiguration of the existing unified and specified commands into four "forces" which would basically absorb the same missions as the commands they replace. The new command structure would likely call for an Atlantic Force, Pacific Force, Contingency Force and Strategic Nuclear Force. This new defense strategy is well formulated to satisfy the United States' security interests. It maximizes available means and resources to meet defense policy objectives and protect national interests.

The Chairman's enumeration of the various armed forces capabilities to support our global interests is central to this discussion. Because, once distilled by his military strategists, what eventually evolves as a new American defense strategy actually represents very little that is new in terms of capabilities. What is purported to be a "new defense strategy" is really a plan which smartly reshapes the military within budget constraints--a plan to build-down the force by 25 percent, a figure contained in the President's budget guidance.

#### *REPACKAGING OLD POLICY FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER*

The principal criticism of the new defense strategy concerns a missed historic opportunity for the United States to assert true leadership as the world's pre-eminent

superpower by not correcting the United Nations' shortcoming cited earlier. Specifically, the criticism of the emerging national defense strategy is that it lacks any provisions, security arrangements or objectives which push the United Nations forward as the world policeman.

Instead, the defense policy guidance and accompanying defense strategy reinforce past practices and capabilities, but in a different configuration at 25 percent less strength. The emerging defense strategy thus misses a propitious opportunity by merely "repackaging" an old policy and force structure--despite recognition of a "different security environment" created by a new world order. This is evidence that, as a superpower, America remains transfixed on an old world security environment.

For a superpower, America's emerging defense strategy does not go sufficiently beyond the realm of its own national interests. It provides for the security needs of the United States, but it makes no substantive commitment to shore up security requirements and interests of the new world order at large. Consequently, in the eyes of some in the international community, the new world order lacks validity, and in turn, the U.S. merely appears to be refortifying its past role as world policeman.

As expected, President Bush's defense guidance was intended to construct a "national" strategy. What we see here is the traditional approach to formulation of defense policy guidance to support a national defense strategy.

However, is it not a fair question to ask: Are alternative defense strategy frameworks permissible in a "different security environment" that the President so passionately speaks of as part of a new world order?

#### IV

##### **AN ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER**

There is an alternative to America's traditional emerging defense strategy. The following proposal represents an alternative strategy and substantive commitment from the United States as the pre-eminent superpower. This alternative strategy takes advantage of an historic opportunity by meeting the challenge of a different security environment created by the new world order.

##### ***A PROPOSAL--THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEMAKING FORCE (UNPF)***

Today, the U.N. lacks credibility in maintaining world order because it has no standing force for deterrence and enforcement of its resolutions. So, as we enter a new world order, a short-notice military employment capability is the most important option we want available to the U.N. and the community of nations during the "warning period" of any impending crisis.

If one accepts this premise, then, logically the United States should expand its defense policy objectives for its new world order defense strategy to include advocating establishment of a standing U.N. peacemaking force (UNPF). This force would provide the U.N. a credible standing military arm to enforce world order.

The UNPF would be established for peacemaking operations. Peacemaking is the full range of activities aimed at ameliorating conflicts between nations. It includes everything from prevention of potential conflicts to activities designed to halt open hostilities (which often may involve the introduction of a peacekeeping operation) to efforts to resolve the core issues in a dispute which has erupted.<sup>2</sup>

The UNPF's primary purpose would be as an on-call (48 hour alert notice) response force operating at the direction of the U.N. Security Council and Secretary General. As a peacemaking force, for example, the UNPF would intervene early on in nation-state disputes to deter and prevent their escalation into regional or local wars. In situations where wars have occurred and cease-fires are imposed, the UNPF could be inserted for peacekeeping--a different role--to oversee implementation of peace treaties and maintain order.

For instance, as a deterrent force, the UNPF could have been an employment option in the recent Persian Gulf crisis in advance of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Perhaps at a point in time prior to the invasion, Kuwait could have requested the U.N. to commit the UNPF along its border with Iraq as part of a training exercise. Another option could have been for the U.N. to deploy the UNPF to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border for the expressed purpose of intervening to deter Iraqi aggression, thereby demonstrating international resolve.

Furthermore, availability of the UNPF could have increased the U.N.'s response options after Iraq's ejection from Kuwait by coalition forces. The UNPF could have immediately deployed as a follow-on peacekeeping force, a force which was not readily available to the U.N. and international community at the end of the Persian Gulf War. The probability of success of such actions will, of course, remain unknown.

Nevertheless, in the case of this war, the UNPF had operational utility in both the pre and post stages of the crisis. From this viewpoint, we can see the utility of establishing such a force. Establishment of the UNPF would give the U.N. and international community a credible military employment option for future crises.

#### *UNPF ORGANIZATION DESCRIPTION*

Formation of the UNPF would be based upon United Nations' members providing specific types of military units, personnel and equipment. Its proposed strength would be approximately 20,000 members, consisting of ground, air, naval and general support components. Its missions, concept of operation, organization and command structure are illustrated at Appendix 1.

Operational commitment of the UNPF, or any element of the UNPF, would rest with the U.N. Security Council. Employment of the UNPF would require a recommendation from the U.N. Military Staff Committee (MSC). Article 47 of the Charter provides for establishment of the MSC "to advise and

assist the Security Council on all questions to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament."<sup>3</sup>

Since its inception, however, the MSC has essentially been moribund, receiving little backing from permanent Security Council members. Most Security Council nation members are hesitant to participate in MSC functions because of its charter responsibility for "strategic direction" of U.N. armed forces. This proposal would include a U.S. initiative to revamp the MSC's functions in a manner suitable to all permanent Security Council members. Regardless, the overall issue of a standing U.N. peacemaking force should not be obfuscated by an unwillingness to correct problems of the MSC.

It's important that this issue be resolved because of the critical requirement to provide an agency for strategic direction of the UNPF, and for an effective command, control and intelligence (C3I) apparatus. The MSC could play heavily into UNPF C3I both in peacetime and when operationally committed. The MSC would, for example, assist the Secretary General with transmission of orders and plans to the UNPF commander.

The UNPF commander would have operational command responsibility for all UNPF field forces. On recommendation from the MSC, the Secretary General would select and appoint

from member nations a UNPF commander and deputy commander who would serve in these positions on a rotational basis. The terms, conditions, responsibilities and duties of the UNPF commander and his deputy would be agreed upon in advance as part of this proposal. The UNPF Commander and headquarters would have a permanent multinational-joint staff which remains in place irrespective of who serves as UNPF commander.

Commitment of the UNPF would require a recommendation from the MSC, with U.N. Security Council approval, before transmission of an execution order to the UNPF commander in the name of the Secretary General. Actual C3I requirements for the UNPF would vary depending on the operational situation. However, execution orders to the UNPF commander would include operational specifics on the mission, force composition and C3I arrangements. C3I proficiency and UNPF readiness would be enhanced through routinely scheduled field training and command post exercises.

#### *GROUND COMPONENT*

The ground component of the UNPF would consist of three motorized (wheeled) infantry brigades. U.N. member nations would provide the brigades on a rotational basis. The brigades would represent the principal headquarters around which most UNPF missions would be task organized for execution.

Each brigade's structure would include combat support elements (e.g. communications, engineers, air defense



artillery) to augment it during operations. Wheeled vehicles with light armament would be organic to each brigade for mobility. Combat service support elements (logistics units) would also be task organized to support each infantry brigade during operations. Logistics units would be provided by the general support brigade.

Each brigade commander would serve under the operational command and control of the UNPF commander during peacetime and when operationally committed. Depending on the complexity of the peacemaking mission, the deputy UNPF commander could serve as the overall ground component commander, if needed.

The most important aspect of the concept of operation for the brigades is that their assigned peacemaking mission ultimately determines the final composition and C3I requirements. The concept is to "force tailor" each brigade for specific peacemaking missions as they occur.

#### *AIR FORCE COMPONENT*

The Air Force wing component would include three air squadrons; two fighter squadrons, one with an eastern hemisphere orientation and the other a western hemisphere orientation. The third squadron would include airborne early warning, electronic warfare and command and control and reconnaissance aircraft.

The wing headquarters would have a permanent multinational staff and be commanded by an officer acceptable to the MSC, Security Council and Secretary

General. This would be a rotational command. The operational chain of command for each squadron commander would be to the wing commander, and he to the UNPF commander.

Because the concept for employment of the UNPF does not include committing forces into high intensity conflicts, the UNPF squadrons would not be expected to conduct the full range of strategic and tactical air missions as performed by, for example, the U.S. Air Force. Instead, UNPF fighter squadrons would provide limited close air support and some battlefield air interdiction in support of deployed UNPF ground forces. Each fighter squadron would, however, have a mix of multi-role aircraft to perform both air-to-ground and air-to-air missions. The actual numbers and types of aircraft would vary depending on training and operational requirements.

A final point on air concerns military lift. The operational movement of UNPF personnel, equipment and cargo would be supported on an as-needed basis by those nations having strategic air lift capability as their contribution to the UNPF arrangement. The requirement for UNPF strategic and intra-theater lift is clearly situational-dependent and expensive, therefore making it impractical to maintain such assets as a permanent part of the UNPF.

#### NAVAL COMPONENT

The UNPF would include two naval contingents afloat at all times--one contingent operating in the Atlantic and another in the Pacific--flying the U.N. flag. The naval

contingents would be composed of different types of vessels provided by member nations. The flag ship and commander of each naval contingent would be recommended by the MSC and approved by the Security Council and Secretary General.

UNPF naval contingents would operate in a manner similar to the NATO standing naval forces. The Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) was established in 1967. Composed of destroyer or frigate class ships drawn from the navies of member countries..... the force carries out a programme of scheduled exercises, maneuvers, and port visits and can be rapidly deployed to a threatened area in times of crisis or tension.<sup>4</sup> A naval component structured along these lines would provide the UNPF with adequate and flexible naval forces required for peacemaking operations. UNPF naval contingents would come under the operational command and control of the UNPF commander.

#### *GENERAL SUPPORT COMPONENT*

The general support brigade commander would be operationally responsible to the UNPF commander for ensuring that the logistical needs of the UNPF were met. The general support brigade would consist of three support battalions. They would provide a wide range of logistical support primarily to ground units which would include transportation, services, supply and maintenance. The support battalions would be habitually aligned to support each of the infantry brigades. In order to enhance readiness, this operational arrangement would exist in

support of both UNPF training exercises and actual peacemaking missions.

As a separate requirement for logistical support, the air and naval force commanders would coordinate and arrange for logistical support through special staff sections of the general support brigade and UNPF headquarters. As a matter of practicality, these forces would report for UNPF service already configured with integrated logistical support packages provided by their parent member nation. A significant portion of the general UNPF logistical effort would be situationally dependent and provided for on a contractual basis, as needed.

The UNPF proposal just described requires U.S. superpower leadership, direction and backing in order to begin functioning, and strong support to continue functioning once started. Obviously, the specifics of command and control, organization, personnel, equipment and training will require substantial research and coordination prior to implementation. Nonetheless, the conceptual framework just described would serve to remedy one of the most significant shortcomings confronting the U.N. and international community as they confront the challenges of a new world order.

#### *EFFECTING CHANGE IN A DIFFERENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT*

The real difficulty in implementing this proposal is, however, how do you effect change? Undoubtedly, there are those who will outright reject this proposal because it

diametrically opposes the traditional U.S. philosophy which avoids placing U.S. forces under others, and the desire for a independent national defense strategy. They will argue that, historically, the forming of standing armies, their deployment and employment is at the basis of the concept of nation-state sovereignty. And to suggest surrendering uniformed forces to an international body adulterates this concept.

By expanding this argument, one could assert that few matters exceed in import than that of a sovereign nation's responsibility to ensure its citizens' security by providing a standing army. Conversely, if one can accept that in some respects, world history and international relations follow linear and not circular logic, then America should exercise its pre-eminence to break the tradition of defense strategies built solely around its own standing forces to deal with conflict.

Force has always been a part of international relations. And traditionally, six methods have been suggested for organizing and preparing for the use of force as part of international relations. These methods may be called (1) isolation, (2) self-help, 3) empire, (4) balance of power, (5) collective security, and (6) international police.<sup>5</sup> Historically, the international arena has witnessed varying degrees of successes and failures with each of these methods. However, world history has never

been visited by any serious attempt to implement a standing internationalized force to police and enforce world order.

In an effort to establish such a force, it's important to note that the international legal foundation to use a U.N. peacemaking force already exists. It would be a procedural matter to establish a U.N. standing force by building upon the existing U.N. Charter. Article 43 of Chapter VII sets forth the requirement for member states to support U.N. military force requirements by stipulating:

1. All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 43 requires U.N. member support for international military forces and not "internationalized" military forces. Internationalized forces would constitute military units under the U.N. flag on a permanent basis whether operationally committed or not. This is an important point in understanding the concept of a standing

U.N. military force, because the proposal just made is for an internationalized peacemaking force.

#### *TOUGH QUESTIONS*

Why should the U.S. support establishment of a standing internationalized peacemaking force? Is it in the best interest of the United States to agree to such a force? These are tough questions, but notwithstanding, the concept of internationalized peacemaking forces is not alien to the United Nations.

At the time of the United Nation's founding, occasional official remarks implied that there was some "original" idea that the United Nations should have a standing force of some kind available to implement its decisions--presumably of the second sort[internationalized]. It may be useful, therefore, to note briefly that responsible United States and United Nations officials have never advocated a permanent U.N. force of that kind--at least not until the proposal in the U.S. Disarmament Plan of 1962.<sup>6</sup>

Although the U.S. Disarmament Plan of 1962 basically reconsidered many of the initial theoretical models of possible U.N. forces, there was some serious discussion of a permanent internationalized peacemaking force. The debate generated by the U.S. Disarmament Plan of 1962 identified many of the advantages and disadvantages of a standing or internationalized standing force.

The U.S. Disarmament Plan of 1962 highlighted many practical questions concerning the operational viability of

a standing U.N. military force. Some of the questions included, for example:

1. What should be the political makeup of the force and its color [racial] composition?
2. To what extent should it consist of a permanent cadre of regular forces, and to what extent should the U.N. depend on a rapid call-up system of national forces tentatively earmarked for international duty in an emergency?
3. What weapons should it have, and what admixture of air, sea, and ground forces? Should it have bombers or only fighters, surface vessels or submarines? And what about tactical nuclear weapons?
4. By what military law should the troops be disciplined? What advance training should the officers have together? How can a peace force have an adequate intelligence arm? What should it do about its own public relations?
5. How should an international force be financed? Where will the money come from?

And finally, the most inclusive and most difficult political question: How should the international force be commanded and controlled? How can the views of great powers, which under a disarmament agreement would be progressively giving up their reliance on national forces and contributing disproportionately to international forces, be given appropriate weight in the command and control system for an international force, without doing violence to what the charter calls "the equal rights . . . of nations large and small"?<sup>7</sup>

No doubt, a standing U.N. military force raises serious and complicated questions. Any proposal for a standing U.N. military force will likely meet with stiff resistance. As an



example of possible opposition to this proposal, consider this quote from the 1966 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Report on the matter of a standing or permanent U.N. military force.

This, from the U.S. standpoint, is the danger. The potentialities of any such possibility raises the question of whether it makes sense for us to promote vigorously the principle of facilitating the initiation of a permanent United Nations Force when the use of those forces may not be in our nation's interests. It is reasonable to assume, that once a permanent force has been established, all sorts of pressures will arise to keep it busy.

With these considerations, the safest path in today's world is a continuation of the pattern of the past--modified by lessons learned--and that is the utilization of an international force made up on contingents of member nations, born of crises and temporary in duration.<sup>8</sup>

This is obviously a strong political expression rejecting a permanent or standing U.N. military policing force. Admittedly, though, it is an expression steeped in the bitterness and mistrust which draped the international community during the East-West struggle. However, the international community has moved beyond the East-West political embroilment.

Understandably, as was argued then, the legal, political and economic difficulties of organizing security through an international police force cannot be minimized. Public opinion must be educated to realize that the sacrifices of sovereignty required by accepting an international police force will be less than the sacrifices

of sovereignty involved in a succession of world wars<sup>9</sup> and regional conflicts.

Others will argue that the existing United Nations peacekeeping force arrangement is acceptable and question: Why change? Are not U.S. interests being adequately provided for with U.N. peacekeeping forces on an "as needed" and "situational" basis? Yes. But the current arrangement of peacekeeping forces does not satisfy the requirement for United Nations' *peacemaking* operations in response to the demands of a new world order.

Under the current arrangement, U.N. peacekeeping forces serve a narrow and generally *post-bellum* role. The U.N. peacekeeping arrangement does not provide for a standing military force capable of short-notice response to intervene and prevent escalation of hostilities. For example, in the U.N.'s forty-three year history it has conducted fourteen peacekeeping operations. In each instance, the U.N. initially witnessed the conflict or dispute as an international bystander, then acted *ex post facto* to influence matters. The international community has once again observed U.N. peacekeeping forces slowly react, this time in the Persian Gulf.

In its most recent deployments of peacekeeping forces (Lebanon, Iran-Iraq, Angola-Namibia, Afghanistan and Iraq) operations have been restricted to overseeing and monitoring of treaty and cease-fire declaration implementation. These U.N. peacekeeping operations were necessary and appropriate,

but again, they were *post-bellum*. And this is the fundamental problem of the existing U.N. military force structure--it is an after the fact arrangement; therefore leaving the U.N. few alternatives but to continue to rely on superpowers to respond in its name to world crises.

In view of the radical changes in the world over the past few years, establishment of a standing U.N. force is permissible. The U.S. should lead this effort for a number of reasons. First, the East-West Bloc wrangling which neutralized the U.N.'s effectiveness in the past has dissipated. Second, democratization and the precept of self-determination are spreading in all regions of the globe because of America's example. Third, the U.S. in earnest faith executed its Persian Gulf strategy under U.N. mandates. In that action, the U.N.'s image and credibility as an international body was bolstered. Fourth, America's international reputation is at an all time high. Fifth, America's fiscal and economic situation diminishes its ability to bear the major burden of world policing actions.

Finally, the world has become extremely interdependent, which complicates traditional defense strategies framed in regional security arrangements and alliance pacts. Furthermore, as we view the world today--except for the Soviet Union--the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council have largely divested themselves of their colonial possessions. Thus, a major impediment to the use of an internationalized peacemaking force is finally

eroding. These conditions permeate the new world order paradigm, making it conducive for new and different national defense strategies and security arrangements.

However, it is important to remember that establishment of such a force can only be achieved with the backing and leadership of the United States. Moreover, the operational viability of a standing U.N. military force would depend on referent powers derived from the United States' pre-eminence, and its supporting defense strategy.

## V

### CONCLUSION

This essay has focused primarily on the United States as a superpower and the formulation of its defense strategy for the new world order. In doing so, it discussed the confluence and impact of recent world events and America's emerging defense strategy to cope with a different security environment in the 1990s. It proposed U.S. support for a standing U.N. peacemaking force as an expansion of America's defense strategy. But primarily, this essay addressed one of the most pressing issues confronting America as the pre-eminent superpower: Who will police the new world order?

Not since the end of World War II have world events propelled America to the international forefront of attention, respect and envy as now. Because of America's example, democracy and the precepts of the right to self-determination appear to be transcending all corners of the

globe. These trends make the role of world policeman more enticing. But can America continue to police the globe? America's challenge for the 1990s is to avoid the trappings of world policing that previous superpowers have succumbed to throughout history, *a la Pax Britannica*.

The United States and the world have arrived at an important period in modern history--a new world order. America has an opportunity to shape and solidify the new world order. This opportunity will be missed if the United States remains inextricably attached to past defense strategies.

The President is correct when he says, "we're entering a new era: the defense strategy and military structure needed to ensure peace can--and must--be different." The proposal for a standing U.N. peacemaking force is an added dimension to America's traditional defense strategy. It will not supplant U.S. superpower military capabilities, but allow them to be held in reserve as a final deterrent, made stronger by U.N. early action, and by not having to respond to every crisis. So, when considered in the broader context of a new world order, this proposal is consistent with President Bush's pronouncement of a different security environment.

As America enters a different security environment, it must demonstrate by action that it truly recognizes a new world order. Support of a standing U.N. peacemaking force is such an action. This action would represent a serious

commitment on America's behalf to the new world order and world interests at large. Moreover, this measure would be a signal to the international community that America fully supports the United Nations and did not use it as a doormat to protect just American interests most recently in the Persian Gulf.

Few periods in this nation's history will ever again offer America the opportunity to better align its defense strategy--that is, achieve a better relationship of means to ends--than now. We have the advantage of pre-eminent superpower status, an environment of emerging democracies and a diminished Soviet threat. Will America take advantage of this opportunity and transform its defense strategy to match the transformations of the new world order, or will this become a time for *Pax Americana*?

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>"United States Defenses-Reshaping Our Forces", By George Bush, President of the United States. Speech delivered at the Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colorado, August 2, 1990. Taken from *Vital Speeches of the Day*, August 1990 Edition, p.676-79.

<sup>2</sup>*UN Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: 20th UN Issues Conference*, Feb. 24-26, 1989, (New York, The Stanley Foundation) p. 12-13.

<sup>3</sup>*United Nations Forces: A Legal Study* (New York, Praeger, 1964), p.12.

<sup>4</sup>*NATO Handbook*, (Brussels, NATO Information Service, 1989), p.76.

<sup>5</sup>*International Police Force*, (New York, Wilson Company, 1944), p.9.


<sup>6</sup>*United Nations Experience With Military Forces: Political and Legal Aspects*, (Washington, D.C., Institute for Defense Analyses, July 1963), p.1-2.

<sup>7</sup>*What An International Peace Force Could Do*, (Washington, D.C., US State Department Bulletin, April 9, 1962), p.585-86.

<sup>8</sup>*United Nations Use of Peacekeeping Forces in the Middle East, the Congo, and Cyprus*, (Washington, D.C., US Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1966), p.8.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.* p.13.

# UNITED NATIONS PEACEMAKING FORCE-UNPF ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE



## TYPES OF MISSIONS

### \* PEACEMAKING

- SHOW OF FORCE
- DEMONSTRATION
- PATROLLING
- NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION
- TRAFFIC CONTROL, CONVOY ESCORT
- LIMITED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
- DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
- SHIP ESCORT

### \* PEACEKEEPING

- OBSERVE & REPORT
- PATROLLING
- DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
- TRAFFIC CONTROL, CONVOY ESCORT
- REFUGEE CONTROL
- SHIP ESCORT

## CONCEPT OF OPERATION

- \*SEC GENERAL APPOINTS UNPF COMMANDER
- \*MIL STAFF COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE FOR STAFF INTERFACE WITH UNPF
- \*GROUND, AIR AND SEA UNITS PROVIDE 48 HR RESPONSE
- \*UNITS DETAILED FOR ONE YEAR MINIMUM TOUR
- \*UNPF IS FORCE TAILORED FOR SPECIFIC MISSIONS; CAN BE AUGMENTED WITH OTHER FORCES
- \*UNPF CONDUCTS ONE MAJOR FIELD & ONE CMD POST EXERCISE ANNUALLY WHEN NOT COMMITTED
- \*FORCES LODGED AT PARENT NATION INSTALLATIONS